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The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct a type of early modern political realism that is perhaps 
less widely researched in the English language scholarly context than the main stream Machiavellian 
type. The Italian ex-Jesuit, Giovanni Botero’s book Della Ragion di Stato (1589) is a fascinating ex-
periment to combine some of the basic insights into arcana imperii (secrets of the state/power) made 
famous by the Florentine, and a refashioned Catholic teaching, as it was presented by the Jesuits. The 
paper tries to show the author’s motivations and his main line of argumentation. The paper starts out 
with a historiographical overview of the state of the art in the ﬁ eld of the history of political realism, 
focusing on two representatives of the so-called Cambridge School, Richard Tuck and István Hont. 
This is followed by a short reconstruction of some of the key terms of Botero’s treatise, based on the 
assumption that the history of ideas has to concentrate on the discourse used in a given context by the 
particular political agent or theorist. Next, certain contexts of Botero’s thought are examined, including 
16th century Tacitism, Lipsius, and the Jesuit tradition with its links to the Salamanca school. Finally, 
one of Botero’s key concepts, the virtue of prudence is analysed, showing the deep-seated connections 
between Botero’s political realism and the ancient Greek, Roman, and Catholic traditions of practical 
philosophy. A postscript links the early modern discourse with the birth of the study of international 
relations. 
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The “historical turn” in the discipline of international relations: 
Richard Tuck and István Hont
People think of the discipline of international relations as being a 20th century sort of 
science. After all, it searches for answers to typically 20th century, global political ques-
tions, with a well-deﬁ ned, 20th century kind of scientiﬁ c methodology and perspective. 
According to the accepted narrative of the history of this science, its founding fathers 
were E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. They were the ones who ﬁ rst started to think 
systematically about the nature of international relations in the interwar and post-war 
period, respectively, oﬀ ering sharp critiques of what they regarded as the liberal utopian-
ism of the post WW I period’s theorisation of international relations. As these questions 
were strongly rooted in the real political context of their own age, a historical approach 
did not seem to be necessary or fruitful.
It is ironic, therefore, that recently even the narrative I referred to above as the dis-
cipline’s birth was seriously questioned. Some think that it can be traced back well into 
the second half of the 19th century. If that is true, it means that even the self-identity of 
the discipline is in a process of transformation, which is accompanied by what is called 
the “historical turn”.1 This turn calls attention to the dangers of a lack of historical sense, 
indicating that without it, present day global political challenges cannot be made intelli-
gible. After all, ‘the political’ itself also has a strong historical component, which is why 
in the ancient world the science of history gave the most sensible analysis and interpreta-
tion of the political phenomenon – think about Thucydides or Tacitus.
The present paper intends neither to evaluate the signiﬁ cance of the historical turn, 
nor to provide a judgement on the challenges confronted by the profession as a result 
of the turn. Rather, it will principally focus on an interesting junction, which has been 
caught sight of only recently. This is the connection between the history of Western poli-
tical thought and a historically sound study of contemporary international relations. The 
interesting fact is that these dimensions are already extant in the writings of some of the 
early modern authors and their historians. If you look at the classic works of the so-called 
Cambridge school, like Pocock’s Machiavellian Moment, or Skinner’s Foundations of 
the History of Political Thought, you will ﬁ nd serious eﬀ orts to reconstruct the early 
modern discourse(s) on politics in its international dimension. However, there are histo-
rians of political thought who actually researched early modern subjects with an inter-
est in present day global politics. I will shortly refer here to two representatives of this 
group, Richard Tuck and István Hont, both of whom– partly reacting to each other’s 
works, partly independently from each other – turned towards a historical reconstruction 
of international relations in the early modern and modern period.2 
1  D. McCourt, What’s at Stake in the Historical Turn? Theory, Practice and Phronēsis in International 
Relations, “Millennium: Journal of International Studies” 2012, Vol. 41 (1), p. 23–42.
2  One should not forget about John Dunn, another Cambridge theorist, who was interested in international 
relations from very early on. We are talking about Cambridge, UK, of course; Richard Tuck’s career started 
from there, too.
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Richard Tuck, who at present is a professor at the Department of Government at 
Harvard University, conducted researched on international (or rather European) political 
thought of the early modern period (16th–17th century) under the inﬂ uence and partly as 
the representative of the Cambridge group of the history of political thought. Importantly, 
Tuck has a sound knowledge of the history of economic thought, and therefore he is in-
terested not only in the development of the political, but also the economic thought of 
this period. This is relevant because economic aspects play a major role in the research 
of international relations as well. First, Tuck reconstructed the natural law discourse of 
the period in his Natural Rights Theories. He revealed in the foreword of his book, that, 
although he was interested in a contemporary political philosophical question – more 
exactly, the problem of the foundation of human rights – he made this historical detour 
because he was convinced that “these problems, like much in the area of moral and po-
litical philosophy, could be solved historically, by an investigation of how the relevant 
language had developed”.3 
In a second monograph in intellectual history entitled Philosophy and Government 
he investigated the connection between (political) philosophy and the political regimes 
of the age. In this work he expounded upon his interest in why and how the practice of 
real life political advising distanced itself from academic/university theories of moral 
philosophy. He tried to discover the signs which showed when and how political “ra-
tionality” became autonomous, and what kind of arguments intellectuals and political 
thinkers who drifted quite close to politics tried in order to systematise or even legitimise 
the widening of the schism between political practice and the Christian norms outlined in 
moral philosophy. As Tuck showed, these later generations of humanists cut themselves 
away from the programme of Ciceronian-Aristotelian moral politics, and presented 
a new mixture of a political ideology, putting together the reception of ancient Stoicism, 
Scepticism, and Tacitism. This new political ideology arguably greatly inﬂ uenced the 
way of political thought in the next century, which was characterised in historiography 
as the age of sovereignty and “absolute” monarchies.4
While Tuck examined the political thought of the late humanists from the perspec-
tive of law, commerce, and philosophy, István Hont preferred to look at the problem in 
the context of the age of Enlightenment, concentrating on economic thinking, history, 
and political ideas themselves, based on natural law. Let me refer to two of his works 
here. First to a multi-authored volume, the by now legendary collection entitled Wealth 
and Virtue, which he co-edited with Michael Ignatieﬀ . This work was built on the recent 
research on the Scottish Enlightenment (in particular, on Hume and Smith), particularly 
looking at the connections between economics and politics in the political thought of the 
18th century. But the relevance of Hont’s own contribution and the perspective it opens 
up could only be seen when his own collected volume of essays was published much 
later. His Jealousy of Trade is a complex and magniﬁ cent work, tracing scrupulously 
a long and tricky story about the role commercial jealousy played in the birth of global 
3  R. Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development, Cambridge 1979, p. 1.
4  Tuck himself argues that to be an advocate of the new ideas did not necessarily mean a radical departure 
from the earlier discourse. A number of thinkers (Lodovico Zuccolo, Federico Bonaventura, and Lodovico 
Sattala) could in fact incorporate new elements into their existing Aristotelian perspective. See: idem, Philosophy 
and Government, Cambridge1993, p. 127–128.
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politics and the ideology of nationalism. His detailed analysis tries to build up a master 
narrative of the way the sharp early-modern competition of European empires and re-
publics led to the discovery by the Scots (quarrelling with the French) of the ideology 
of unashamed national rivalry (based on economic interest), and how they formulated 
the theoretical framework of global economic rivalry and political strife, which is still 
a valid description of global aﬀ airs today, labelled as capitalism. 
The work of Tuck and Hont (together with a number of their colleagues both in and 
outside of Cambridge) led a new generation of scholars to reﬂ ect on the question how to 
capitalise on the reﬁ ned methodology and the excellent research ﬁ ndings of the history 
of political thought in the theoretical debates of international relations.5 The present pa-
per, too, aims at joining the discussion initiated by these two Cambridge researchers and 
their circle, when, considering the origins of political realism, it reconstructs the Italian 
sources of ragione di stato. It will focus on the thought of Giovanni Botero, a 16th cen-
tury Italian Jesuit, with the intention of recovering the present day political philosophi-
cal relevance of his system of thought. Its methodology is going to be quite close to 
that of the history of political thought, circumscribing some of the basic concepts of 
Botero, with their background of late Renaissance Italian city states, identifying the in-
tellectual contexts in which this oeuvre ﬁ ts (mentioning eminently Tacitus, Lipsius, and 
the Jesuit tradition). Based on this historical reconstruction it will ask the philosophical 
signiﬁ cance of Botero’s concept of reason of state (in particular, comparing it with the 
Ciceronian-Aristotelian teaching, and in general, with the republican tradition).6 Finally, 
it will have a short look at the historical consequences of the universal applicability 
of reason of state, claiming that the afterlife of the term connects Botero like a hidden 
stream not only with Cardinal Richelieu, but also with Prince Metternich, and ﬁ nally 
with the theoretical founding fathers of the discipline of international relations (IR) in 
20th century US, including Henry Kissinger.
Giovanni Botero and the contexts of the doctrine
of ragione di stato
The hero of our story is Giovanni Botero (1544–1619), a late humanist and one-time 
Jesuit, who published a number of important theoretical works in the last two decades of 
the 16th century. He does not belong today to the top of the canon of political thought, but 
his work had a deep eﬀ ect on the notions of states and their rulers both in his own age and 
5  In a personal letter [e-mail received on 12.20.2015] John Dunn, a close colleague and friend of Hont 
listed the following formal students of Hont: Bela Kapossy, Richard Whatmore, Sophus Reinert, Isaak 
Nakhimovsky, Ian McDaniel, and Paul Sagar. But he also mentioned a number of scholars who were not 
necessarily students of his, but who acknowledged his inﬂ uence on their way of thought: Richard Bourke, 
Duncan Kelly, Duncan Bell, Michael Sonenscher, Richard Tuck (“who really only acknowledges Moses 
Finley and Istvan as formative intellectual inﬂ uences”), and Raymond Geuss. I am also grateful to Béla 
Kapossy and John Robertson for further information of the list of Hont’s students. 
6  This paper does not diﬀ erentiate between the diﬀ erent translation of the term: ragion di stato, raison 
d’état, ratio status, Staatsräson, but takes them as synonyms for the purposes of the present paper. 
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in the century which followed his death. He is interesting for us in this context because 
he was a key player in the renewed political realist discourse based on the concept of 
reason of state. The speciﬁ c quality of his position is secured by his anti-Machiavellian, 
Catholic perspective.
1. Some relevant moments of Botero’s life
For some time, Botero belonged to the most combative representatives of reborn Catholic 
theory and teaching. This is not accidental, as he was educated by the Jesuits in Palermo 
and Rome.7 According to his professors in Rome he was already an ornery type of per-
sonality, which made him a troublemaker, and that is why he was sent to peripheral 
colleges as a tutor. Later, after another period of intense learning, he himself expressed 
a wish to be sent to Germany, in order to let him show his rhetorical and debating abili-
ties against the great rival, the protestant pastors. Instead he was sent to France, where, 
at the time of the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre (August 24/25, 1572) of French 
Huguenots (Protestants) in Paris, souls were not ruled by peaceful sentiments. The pas-
sionate young man, who was agitating against the Spanish king, Philip II, had to be 
called back from Paris before he should ﬁ nd himself serving French royal interests in-
stead of those of Catholicism. After his return, he was ordered to move to Milan, where 
he taught in the local college. After that episode Padua and Genoa were the next stations. 
For some time he was even considering travelling to America to look for new challenges, 
until one day when he gave an oration which sharply criticized the worldly power of the 
pope, and was called upon to leave the order.
Milanese Archbishop, Carlo Borromeo took the enthusiastic ex-Jesuit under his pro-
tection which made it easier for him to stand on his own feet. Botero soon became the 
Archbishop’s secretary, and after his master’s death he served the Archbishop’s nephew 
with the same fervour. It was during this period that he published the direct antecedent 
of his Della ragion di Stato, the book entitled De regia sapientia (1583), dedicated to 
Carlo Emanuele, Duke of Savoy. In this tractatus, written in the scholastic style, the 
author already represented an Anti-Machiavellian position, which would characterise all 
the work he published later. Though at ﬁ rst glance his work appeared to be similar to the 
writings of the School of Salamanca, in his argumentation he preferred to build less on 
logic, and more on rhetoric, as was to be expected from a person familiar with the new 
fashion of humanistic thinking. He started to write his most important works after an-
other trip to France, where he may possibly have met with the increasingly popular trea-
tise of Jean Bodin (Les six livres de la République, 1576), written in the aftermath of the 
massacre. That is how Delle cause della grandezza e magnifi cenza delle città was ﬁ rst 
born in 1588. Then in 1589 he wrote Della ragion di Stato, and between 1591 and 1595 
Relazioni Universali was published. These three pieces (of widely diﬀ erent topics and 
scopes) appeared in close proximity, oﬀ ering a good overview for readers of Botero’s 
wide range of interests, and the complexity of his way of thinking. In the ﬁ rst of them 
7  One of his uncles taught in the Jesuit college in Palermo. 
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he summed up what he knew about early-modern – mostly, but by no means exclusively 
Italian – cities, obviously relying on his own ﬁ rst-hand experience of life in Rome and 
Paris. The second one is a collection of political considerations about how to preserve 
empires, and the third is a comparative analysis (like those of Aristotle and Bodin) of 
the known world as it was opened up by geographic discoveries, missions of overseas 
colonisation, and the establishments of long distance trade. Of the three of them, the 
last one had the widest impact in its own time, but his work on reason of state was also 
translated into German, French, Spanish, and Latin.8 This would permit the kings and 
subjects of the two countries which contended for control of Italy to read the book in 
their mother tongue, while the Latin translation made it available to cultivated readers in 
other parts of Europe as well. It is known that his work on reason of state caught the at-
tention of Gaspare de Guzman, Count-Duke of Olivares, who was advisor to the king of 
Spain, and that the book was on the reading list of both Maximilian I, Herzog in Bayern 
and Kurfürst of the Holy Roman Empire, and of Ferdinand II, Holy Roman Emperor and 
king of Bohemia and Hungary.
Having achieved such marvellous intellectual performances, Botero ﬁ nished his ser-
vice at the side of Frederick Borromeo, and joined the entourage of Carlo Emanuele, the 
great Duke of Savoy, as tutor to his three children. As such, he travelled around Spain 
between 1603 and 1607, and still published; ﬁ rst a collection of biographies of famous 
ancient statesmen, entitled I Prencipi (1600), and then another collection of more mod-
ern examples of statesmanship. But these works could not surpass the inﬂ uence of his 
greatest books. 
2. Key concepts of Botero’s book On Reason of State
By the time he published his volume On Reason of State, this concept had already been 
in use for some time. Apparently, the ﬁ rst use of the term was found in a speech by 
Archbishop Giovanni della Casa, addressed to emperor Charles V. The best known 
of the forerunners is Guicciardini, who, on the other hand, was himself linked to the 
greatest disquisitore of Botero, another Florentine, the infamous Machiavelli. To sum 
up his intentions in a shorthand form, Botero wanted to reformulate the realist way of 
thought and talk, which was (re)invented by Machiavelli, and which, by Botero’s time, 
was accused of inﬁ delity. His unbalanced relationship to his Florentine predecessor can 
be characterised by the following two statements: 1) he accepts the radical innovation 
of Machiavelli, who was not interested in the moralism of the traditional Aristotelian–
Ciceronian humanist framework, but focused rather on political reality; 2) but denies 
the Machiavellian claim that political power – in the name of the common good – could 
claim the authority to do whatever it regarded to be necessary; in other words, Botero 
8  P. Burke, Tacitism, Scepticism, and Reason of State [in:] The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 
1450–1700, J.H. Burns (ed.), Cambridge 1991, p. 479.
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tries to lead back the discourse within the framework of the Christian humanist dis-
course.9 
From the very start it is clear that Botero is brave enough to put ragion di stato into 
the centre of the talk on politics. He deﬁ nes reason of state in the following way: “State is 
a stable rule over a people (Stato é un dominio fermo sopra popoli) and Reason of State 
is the knowledge of the means by which such a dominion may be founded, preserved 
and extended (fondare, conservare e ampliare ). [...] for Reason of State assumes a ruler 
(il Prencipe) and a state (lo Stato) (the one as artiﬁ cer, the other as his material)”.10 From 
the beginning the author adds to this deﬁ nition, that all activity pursued with such aims 
belong to what he calls reason of state, but most eminently those activities which cannot 
be examined in the light of ordinary reason (ragione ordinaria), creating an opposition 
of two kinds of reasonability.11
Although the questions he addresses partly cover Machiavelli’s programme, the 
foundations upon which Botero builds indeed have characteristically anti-Machiavellian 
features. For example, when he criticises cruelty as a fundamentally false strategy in 
politics: “Cruelty (crudeltà) towards subject, and licentiousness, which dishonours all 
men and in particular the noble and generous, also bring ruin upon the State” [4–5].12 He 
also criticises ambitious (and foolish) princes, who too “bring ruin upon their States by 
dispersing their strength in an attempt to undertake what is beyond their means” [5]. This 
moderation in the use of cruelty returns later, too – although Botero admits that success-
ful conquest might require power (forza), yet preserving power is more burdensome, and 
might require wisdom (sapienza) as well.
Interestingly here he already refers to Tacitus, and by doing so opens up one of the 
most important possible directions for us to interpret what he has to say.13 It is perhaps 
not by chance that (contrary to Machiavelli, who chose to give advice to his prince when 
the latter had to confront the problems of newly acquired power) Botero’s prince seems 
to be less interested in how to get more power, than in how to preserve what has already 
been earlier acquired, i.e. in the common interest of all (the state). In an anachronistic 
way the diﬀ erence is between the interest of the ruler (Machiavelli), and the interest 
of the political community (Botero). It is therefore not surprising that after Tacitus he 
9  In this regard the opposite pole to Machiavelli’s position is taken by Erasmus, who in his The Education 
of a Christian Prince (1516) written three years after The Prince, but published earlier than Machiavelli’s 
piece, kept the original Christian humanist framework. 
10  G. Botero, The Reason of State: The Greatness of Cities, New Haven 1956, p. 3, http://babel.
hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015002702705;view=1up;seq=23. Italian version: Della Ragione di Stato, 
in Venetia, appresso I Gioliti, MDXCVIII, https://ia600300.us.archive.org/13/items/dellaragionedist00bote/
dellaragionedist00bote_bw.pdf (27.04.2016).
11  Ibidem, p. 3. This comment appears in the 1598 edition, it is missing from the original one. The term 
‘ordinary reason’ is important because it is connected to the Thomist philosophical tradition (recta ratio), 
as well as to the term ‘common sense/bon sens’ of modern philosophy. It is also remarkable because Botero 
here shows that he is always ready to moderate the radicalism of his own view, making it clear, that only the 
exceptional, particular, urgent cases might require the special logic of political realism. 
12  English quotes are taken from the online English edition, see above. Italian terms are given from 
the online Italian edition, mentioned above. From now on, the numbers in brackets refer to the pages of the 
English translation of Botero’s work.
13  For the Botero–Tacitus connection, see: K.C. Schellhase, Botero, “Reason of State”, and Tacitus [in:] 
Botero e La “Ragion di Stato: Atti dei Convegni in Memoria di Luigi Firpo”, A.E. Baldini (ed.), Firenze 1992. 
The Renaissance of Political Realism in Early Modern Europe: Giovanni Botero...
2-łamanie-KS.indd   193 2016-10-21   13:51:10
194
Artykuły – Articles
promptly quotes Aristotle, too, arguing that for the Greek philosopher the most impor-
tant job of the legislator is to preserve the polis for a long time.14 The interpretation 
of Botero’s doctrine of reason of state which ﬁ nds its function in a total denial of the 
Aristotelian–Ciceronian direction, leaves out this aspect of his thought, and seems to me 
to be misdirected.15 Botero remains relevant today because he is quite determined to ﬁ nd 
the via media between Machiavelli’s new and egoistic and the traditional, Aristotelian 
moral style of political discourse. He is aware of the freshness of the Florentine secre-
tary’s insights, and of his approach of disenchantment, and yet he does not fully accept 
it. For him political thought is not only a cold and impartial summary of the facts, but 
also the drawing of conclusions in a way which allows one’s audience to see the norma-
tive dimensions as well. The novelty of Botero’s way of thinking in his own day was 
a departure from the naïve and idealistic talk of politics characteristic of the antique and 
Christian political theory of the earlier periods. At the beginning of his book he already 
brings up important new issues, for example his preference for middle-sized states. As 
he sees it, large states are prone to become subjects of envy, while small ones can easily 
become prey to the large ones’ cruelty. But medium-sized states have a moderate control 
over two of the most important goods of states, namely wealth (ricchezze) and power 
in the positive sense of the ability to act (potenza), and therefore any passions (pas-
sioni) or ambitions (ambitione) turning against them are also less brutal, and can garner 
less support. This is an argument in favour of the golden mean, which, since it tries to 
provide safeguards against the extremities of passions, is an obvious engagement with 
the Aristotelian tradition. Nor is not by chance either that his reference point – beyond 
Sparta and Carthage – is Venice, of which it was well known that the causes of its long 
term survival were these: that it was a midsized power, and that it could preserve stability 
(più stabile) together with power (più fermo) (Book 1, Chapter 6). An important condi-
tion for such long survival is that the ruler is reconciled with the fact that he governs 
a midsized state. The fact that he successfully preserved his power for a long time is 
proof of the Venetians’ virtues, including (besides a mixed regime) moderation, which 
is transferred here from individual morality to the new context of the European states’ 
struggle for empire. 
Of course, just as Machiavelli, while giving advice to the prince, kept his republican 
identity, Botero, who worked out the theory of reason of the early-modern state was still 
loyal to republican political virtues. This is clear if we consider that although he is a sup-
porter of the economic competition of cities and states, and – unlike Machiavelli – also 
recognised the signiﬁ cance of commerce and the peace that makes commerce possible, 
he used very harsh words against those generations of ancient Rome who became weak 
and morally corrupted as a result of luxurious consumption, and who forgot about the 
defence of their patria because of their wish to maximise their individual sensory pleas-
ure. He is a defender of Roman virtue (virtù romana) [12] in the most traditional sense 
of the term, and unlike the sense used by Machiavelli. It is also in accordance with the 
traditional Greco-Roman moral doctrine, that he regards external threat as a less immi-
nent danger than the atrophy of the inner moral sense. He seems to share the common 
14  Botero refers to Aristotle’s Politics, Book 2, 1274. 
15  One of these interpreters is Peter Burke, in his above-mentioned, inﬂ uential book. 
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wisdom according to which the power of the soul makes the conclusive diﬀ erence, not 
the material conditions.
But he chooses from the Greco-Roman heritage in a selective way – the wartime 
virtues are not really relevant for him. In his view the ﬁ rst prerequisite of the preserva-
tion of the state is to secure the peace and calm (quiete e pace) [15] of the citizens. And 
by the term ‘war’ he means not only external and violent conﬂ icts but also rebellion and 
civil war, too. Against these risks a remedy can be provided by those arts (arti) [15] by 
which the prince can win the love and admiration of the people. However, when Botero 
thinks about the dilemma as to whether reputation or love (riputatione o l’amor) [15] is 
more valuable for the ruler, his starting point is the common good, which is a typically 
Roman-Christian notion. He also thinks that the people look for leaders, who excel in 
courage and virtue (eccellenza di valore e di virtù) [16], and therefore can serve the com-
mon cause. In the long term, it is only personal excellence that can guarantee loyalty, 
without which the preservation of the state is impossible. With the help of such excel-
lence, the ruler can distinguish himself among his compatriots, a conclusion that makes 
Botero’s theory relevant for the justiﬁ cation of absolute rule, as well, for he ascribes an 
almost celestial and divine greatness (una certa grandezza quasi celeste e divina) [18] to 
the best of rulers. True enough, he makes eﬀ orts to trace this assumption back to ancient 
authors, including (beside Tacitus) once again Aristotle, who regarded those holding 
practical wisdom and good judgement as being beholders of natural rationality and this 
way true members of a natural elite. 
The reputation of a ruler who belongs to this natural elite has two conditions, which 
are also the two most important pillars of any government: valour (valore) and practi-
cal wisdom (prudenza) [47]. Botero analysed this last one with extra care, because he 
thought that the rationality of the state requires exactly this virtue. We shall return to this 
concept later on, as this one will shed light on the connection between the doctrine of 
reason of state and political realism. 
If we try to delineate some of the key concepts of Botero’s vision of politics (in-
cluding reason of state, preservation of the state, wisdom versus power, wealth and po-
tentiality, stability, peace, reputation, natural ruling virtues, valour, and prudence), then 
perhaps one can indeed make sense of the claim, that this is a theory which is halfway 
between the traditional moralising ancient-Christian-humanist position and the modern-
ist-Machiavellian position, which emphasises the autonomy of the political. 
In what follows we are going to examine how Botero’s way of thinking compares 
with some of the leading minds and trends of his period. First, we compare it to the 
early-modern discourse of Tacitism, then to the Christian Stoic scepticism of Lipsius, 
and ﬁ nally to the pattern of political thought advocated by the Jesuits and Dominicans of 
the day. I will not deal speciﬁ cally with the Machiavelli–Botero connection, but rather 
will touch upon that theme within the context of Tacitism. Nor shall I deal with the 
Bodin–Botero connection, as this topic still requires further investigation on my part.16
16  Bodin is adequately captured by the study of Bodroﬀ , mentioned above. Unfortunately, I will not 
be able to describe the Guicciardini-Botero link either in the scope of this paper, because this topic requires 
special treatment as well.
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The rise of Tacitism in the 16th century
If we approach the inﬂ uences which might be relevant for Botero’s thought from the 
perspective of the discourse of reason of state, the ﬁ rst one which comes to mind is 
Tacitism. István Borzsák quotes “the monographer of staatsräson”, Meinecke, who fa-
mously claimed that the idea of ragione di stato was not invented out of the blue, but can 
be traced back to the works of Tacitus.17 The term Tacitism dos not relate to the historical 
ﬁ gure of a Roman author with that name, but refers to an early-modern, late humanist 
intellectual “fashion”, which had a dominant inﬂ uence. The name of the author himself 
is used here only as a label, as an argument of authority. According to Borzsák, “the cen-
turies long reception of Tacitus […] is not the same as the modern concept of Tacitism”.18 
He even provides a deﬁ nition of Tacitism as it was meant in the early-modern period: in 
his view this term referred to that political literature which appeared in the period after 
the Renaissance, “in which the forbidden name of Machiavelli was replaced by that of 
Tacitus, who was not at all problemless, but who was regarded acceptable according to 
contemporary court standards”.19
It is well-known that, besides Machiavelli, Botero mentions Tacitus in the recom-
mendation of his book. Although he seemingly strongly criticises both, in fact he does 
not condemn Tacitus, the person, but the hero of his historical narrative, emperor Tiber, 
who in his view has misused the reference to reason of state.20
If we try to assess his references in a systematic manner, we ﬁ nd that Tacitus is one 
of the sources which returns most often. This is all the more interesting if we recall 
that in his De regia sapientia, which had been completed only a few years earlier, in 
1582–1583, we do not ﬁ nd traces of the disillusioned historian of late ancient Rome. To 
explain this fresh interest in Botero’s thinking researchers had very diverse suggestions. 
This paper is not in a position to decide who is right in that debate. Momigliano thought 
that Botero could have met Carolus Paschalius in his travels to Paris, and this latter was 
an ardent supporter of the rehabilitation of Tacitus.21 Schellhase, however, thought that 
they could have met in a number of ways, including the following options: that Botero 
accidentally heard Muret’s lectures at some time between 1580–1582; that he could have 
17  I. Borzsák, A tacitizmus kérdéséhez [in:] Dragma. Válogatott tanulmányok, Budapest 1994, p. 279–
291, 283.
18  Ibidem, p. 281.
19  Ibidem, p. 290.
20  The exact relation between Botero and Tacitus remains an open question for most of the secondary 
literature. Peter Burke holds the view that the many references to Tacitus are not enough to claim that he turned 
against Tacitus. In Schellhase’s opinion Botero’s references are neutral. He thinks that Botero’s approach to 
Tacitus is just as critical as his views of Machiavelli. About the diﬀ erent views, see: K.C. Schellhase, Tacitus 
in Renaissance Political Thought, Chicago 1976. 
21  A. Momigliano, The First Political Commentary on Tacitus, “The Journal of Roman Studies”,
Vol. 37, No. 1–2, p. 9 –101. Momigliano has pointed out that both Paschalius and Lipsius published a Tacitus 
commentary in 1581, and argued that Paschalius had a stronger impact on many of those who came to join the 
camp of Tacitism, than Lipsius did. See: idem, Tacitus and the Tacitist Tradition: The Foundations of Modern 
Historiography, Berkeley 1990, p. 109–131, 124. 
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come across Tacitus while he was reading Bodin in Paris; or that he read of the parallels 
between the early-modern rulers and Tiber in Guicciardini or Lipsius.22
The important thing for us here in this ﬁ ne, micro-historical debate is the claim that 
Botero’s ideas of reason of state are not rooted in Machiavelli’s thought, which by then 
was strictly forbidden, but from the Tacitism of the 1580s. And the relevance of this ge-
nealogy is that it makes it obvious that, although Botero originally intended to criticise 
both of these traditions, he was much closer to the disillusioned picture of man as was 
outlined in early-modern Tacitism than to Machiavelli. Therefore we have good reason 
to regard him as one of the founders of that wing of early-modern political realism which 
remained within the conﬁ nes of Christian humanism, while the other wing crossed this 
line with Niccolò Machiavelli. 
Lipsius, Botero, and the critique of Machiavelli
Tacitism met with the early-modern, or late-renaissance idea of reason of state in the 
oeuvre of another political theorist who had an even wider reception than Botero. Justus 
Lipsius was born in the southern part of the Low Countries as Joost Lips. He became 
a very well-educated philologist-humanist, who published two volumes of interest to 
us: a moral philosophical piece on De Constantia and a political piece entitled Politica. 
The two ancient authors who had a lasting inﬂ uence on him were Seneca and Tacitus. 
He published original text editions of Tacitus, but as he was not himself a historian, one 
can easily come to the conclusion that his interest in him was not motivated by Tacitus 
the historian, but more by the problem of political sobriety, which is one of this author’s 
key issues. 
If we try to reconstruct the link between Lipsius and Botero, the ﬁ rst thing to ask 
is whether they could have actually met. Some scholars argue that they could easily 
have met. Richard Tuck calls attention to the fact that according to his correspondence, 
Lipsius got Botero’s book on reason of state in 1597.23 But even more interestingly, Tuck 
suggests that Botero, too, could have heard about Lipsius’ activities through his mas-
ters, the Borromeos, who were corresponding with Lipsius.24 In Tuck’s view Lipsius be-
longed to that wave which was criticising Machiavelli, but tried to take over his armour 
to use it against him, to appropriate whatever seemed suitable from the teachings of the 
Florentine, to be used within a Christian discourse on politics. Botero himself belonged 
to this wave, too. He took the technique of attacking Tacitus and Machiavelli, and in the 
meantime tried to get a grip on their armour, to use it to defend his own argumentation.
This was the technique used by Lipsius. He deliberately deceived his opponents, 
concealed his own views, and, what is even more unorthodox, he often changed them, 
behaving like a religious Nicodemite in the realm of politics.25 This might be one of the 
22  K.C. Schellhase, Tacitus…, p. 125, 126, 219–220.
23  R. Tuck, Philosophy…, p. 61.
24  Ibidem, p. 66.
25  Nicodemism was regarded as a strategy of dissimulation, in matters of religion in the early modern 
period, after Calvin’s famous piece: Excuse à Messieurs les nicodémites (1544). 
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reasons why we cannot easily pinpoint his position even today. His major work, writ-
ten in the style of Seneca, focuses on the undoubtedly Stoic virtue of constancy, and 
further Stoic virtues, including ataraxia or apatheia, often return in his writings. But as 
a political thinker he was much closer to the Antimachiavellian and Tacitist literature. It 
is not an exaggeration to say what Robert Bireley suggests, claiming that, together with 
Botero, Lipsius can easily be regarded as the founder of a speciﬁ cally Catholic “Anti-
Machiavellian” political way of thinking, whose “concern was to elaborate a vision of 
practical politics, in response to Machiavelli, that would be moral, Christian, and eﬀ ec-
tive in the circumstances of the late sixteenth century”.26
Of course, we have already pointed out above that in Lipsius’ case, we cannot be fully 
convinced of either his religious beliefs, or his political convictions, as he concealed both 
and also changed them frequently. This concealment is closely related to exactly that 
idea of politics which we are addressing, which is part and parcel of court life not only 
in Renaissance Italy, but throughout Europe up into the Baroque period. The courtier’s 
strategy is nicely theorised in the court literature of the era, centred as it is on the notion 
of simulation/dissimulation – the deceit of the prince is not so far away from that, of 
course.27 As Leo Strauss kept stressing, the same cover strategies were followed by the 
authors of the theoretical literature of early modernity, which makes the debate about 
Botero’s and Lipsius’ exact philosophical positions even more diﬃ  cult to terminate. 
Christopher Brooke, for example, doubts the interpretation of Bireley, and claims that 
the Anti-Machiavellians’ doctrines were much closer to Machiavelli, but concealed be-
cause of the alertness of the censorship authorities of the Vatican. Jan Hendrik Waszink 
detected that Politica was on the Index of the Vatican for only a short while, and when 
certain parts of it were cut out, it could immediately disappear form that infamous list.28 
The present paper is not entitled to take a position in this debate, the less so as we ad-
mit that the rhetorical strategy of simulation/dissimulation makes it fully unreasonable 
to attribute a well-deﬁ ned and stable philosophical position to these authors. We only 
concentrate on the question of how to describe their relationship to the Machiavellian 
challenge. This paper accepts as honest their claim that they wanted to dispose of the 
exaggerations of the Florentine, while accepting much of the practical view of politics 
reintroduced by Machiavelli, but transferring it into the context of the Christian human-
istic discourse. In this respect this paper is perhaps closest to the interpretation of Jan 
Papy who denied that his contemporary critics had either provided a full refutation of 
Machiavelli’s ideas, or had been his secret fans. As he saw them they were working on 
a synthesis of a direct way of talking about politics while still preserving external stand-
ards to judge political agents, besides the practical standard of success. Papy found that 
in De Constantia there was already an eﬀ ort to create a synthesis, where the two poles 
to bridge were Christianity and Stoicism. The same wish to negotiate was present in the 
Politica, too, which is “an attempt to produce a synthesis between the traditional mirror 
26  R. Bireley, The Counter-Reformation Prince: Anti-Machiavellianism or Catholic Statecraft in Early 
Modern Europe, Chapel Hill 1990, p. 73.
27  See: B. Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier, Garden City 1959; P. Burke, The Fortunes of the 
Courtier: The European Reception of Castiglione’s Cortegiano, Cambridge 1995.
28  Ch. Brooke, Philosophic Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to Rousseau, Princeton 
2012.
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of princes, a popular genre among humanists, and Machiavelli’s The Prince”.29 Lipsius’ 
supposed, most probably not wholly successful attempt to ﬁ nd a synthesis is to be un-
derstood in the context of the tendency of the early-modern period to mix up diﬀ erent 
traditions and mediate between rather divergent discourses. The third context we refer to 
is also an example of this intellectual plurality of the age: the tradition of Jesuit political 
thinkers, which is also full of examples of making use of the rhetorical and conceptual 
armour of the opponents in the strategic games of scholarly debate. 
The context of early-modern Catholic philosophy: Salamanca 
and the Jesuit tradition
As was mentioned earlier, Botero was deeply inﬂ uenced by the Jesuit educational model. 
Being brought up in it, he himself taught in Jesuit colleges, and when he had to leave the 
order, he still remained in many ways within the conﬁ nes of this way of thinking. One 
should also keep in mind that a lot of his readers could interpret Botero’s own philosophy 
as a teaching which makes sense in the context of Jesuit education. In this respect it is 
important that in the 1580s–1590s a body of educational norms was put together, called 
the Ratio Studiorum, which summed up the decades of experience of teaching in Jesuit 
schools, and deﬁ ned the canon taught in the Jesuit educational institutions. In the Jesuit 
educational model philosophy was based on Aristotle and Aquinas. The consequence of 
this fact for political thought was that the Jesuit way of thinking – like the humanists’ 
one, too – connected the realist wing of ancient political thought with certain dominant 
authors of the Christian tradition. In this respect we cannot speak about radical innova-
tion. It is better to see it as a new combination of existing traditions, a synthesis, which 
served speciﬁ cally the Jesuit mission.
The Salamanca School, a spiritual circle around the professor Francisco de Vitoria 
(1483–1546) had a great impact on this emerging canon. Vitoria was a Dominican friar. 
He studied in Paris, and acquainted himself with the ruling paradigms of the philosophy 
of the early 16th century, among others, with that of Erasmus. When he started to teach in 
Salamanca, a school was soon crystallising around him, grappling with the problem of 
collecting the new tendencies of the age under the umbrella of a reconstructed Thomist 
theoretical framework. He had to react not only to the elastic rhetorical ideas of the hu-
manists and the innovative theological views of the reformers, but also to the new politi-
cal experiences that were being born as a result of the global discoveries across the seas. 
A host of new challenges emerged on the ﬁ eld of domestic policy, too, in Spain, as well 
as on the Continent, where the Spanish king was one of the defenders of Catholicism 
and a key player in the new rush for universal empire. Vitoria is regarded by many with 
some exaggerations as one of the founders of international law. A recent interpretation, 
29  J. Papy, Justus Lipsius [in:] The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2011/entries/justus-lipsius/ (10.12.2015). 
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however, talks about him as the representative of early-modern global political philoso-
phy, as well.30
Vitoria was inﬂ uential within his own home university, on people like another 
Dominican, Domingo de Soto, and the Jesuit Francisco Suárez, themselves important 
authorities in their own right. But his spiritual inﬂ uence has grown much beyond his 
alma mater, and the way of thought labelled as the Salamanca School became a standard 
for much of the whole early-modern Catholic world. The ideas of Vitoria, together with 
those of Suárez and Bellarmino, played a major role in the discourse, which functioned 
as the theoretical part of the struggle to divide the world among the European superpow-
ers, and to conclude the European competition among the diﬀ erent Christian denomina-
tions, which was also joined, though from the other side, by Hugo Grotius from the Low 
Countries. Suárez and Vitoria represented a more philosophical, natural law position, 
while Bellarmino concerned himself more with the theological arguments, which he sup-
plemented with historical analyses.31
If we read them in this context, Botero’s arguments appear in a diﬀ erent light than 
along the Lipsius–Machiavelli axis, or when we read them from the perspective of his 
relationship with Tacitus. From this point of view, what matters is not the fact that Botero 
would like to reconcile the spiritual and moral authority attributed to the ruler and uti-
lity, the demands of reason of state, and a responsibility for the whole community. In this 
respect the inﬂ uence of Salamanca-style Catholic teaching on him is obvious.32 For in-
deed, the members of the Salamanca School were all interested in reconciling divergent 
theoretical models, like late Scholasticism with natural law and the new, international 
economic-global order, and were also inﬂ uenced by the new discoveries and the occupa-
tion of foreign dominions by the European great powers.
Unfortunately, according to his sharpest critics, Botero saw his own reconciliation 
too optimistically unproblematically, which might in the ﬁ nal analysis be labelled as 
disregard for moral problems, as well as mistaken judgement of the logical diﬃ  culties. 
If we accept that his conciliatory moves were theoretically rather shallow, the charge of 
tacit Machiavellianism can once again be brought back against him.
There are two further points to make, which seem to be even more important, though 
less evidently rising from the same roots. One of them is the economic aspect, the other 
one, the appearance of a global approach in Botero’s way of political thinking. Both of 
these two aspects were inspired by the Salamanca way of thinking and both had a de-
cisive role as to why Botero’s work looked seminal in the 17th century. Let us therefore 
30  J. Thumfart, Die Begründung der globalpolitischen Philosophie: Zu Francisco de Vitorias “relectio 
de indis recenter inventis” von 1539, Berlin 2009. For an overall discussion of the theoretical backbones of 
the newly emerging global order of the period, see: A. Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire 
in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500–1800, London–New Haven 1995; Lineages of Empire: The Historical 
Roots of British Imperial Thought, D. Kelly (ed.), Oxford 2009.
31  R. Bireley, The Refashioning of Catholicism, 1450–1700: A Reassessment of the Counter Reformation, 
Washington 1999, p. 80–81.
32  Botero is sometimes regarded as belonging to that group of Jesuits (called the Coimbra School), 
who took over the leading role in intellectual life from the Dominicans at the end of the 16th century. See for 
example Andrea Finkelstein, who claims that followers of the Salamanca school in Italy included Botero: 
A. Finkelstein, Harmony and the Balance. An Intellectual History of Seventeenth-Century English Economic 
Thought, Ann Arbor 2000, p. 4.
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touch upon them brieﬂ y. Both themes have a much wider connotation than our present 
concern here, and they represent a call to approach Botero’s work holistically, which is 
impossible in the present paper. Let us deal brieﬂ y with the two aforementioned aspects.
For the economic perspective one needs to consult his shorter piece, created just 
a bit earlier than Ragione di Stato. It is entitled Delle Cause della grandezza e magnifi -
cenza delle città (1588). The author’s aims are not as elevated here as in the two other 
masterpieces. Here he is simply interested in the factors that select a given town, and 
elevate it above the others in greatness and richness.33 He observes that to become great 
a town requires an adequate quality of soil, and richness of the territory which serves it. 
But he also drew attention to the importance of the special handicrafts and trades that 
are characteristic of a given town. He moves one step further when he claims that even 
intellectual abilities can contribute to the rise of a town. His example is Rome, where, he 
claimed, the cultivation of religious rituals, the relics of the saints, and even the sancti-
ﬁ ed spaces of the churches and other halls of religious practice contributed to raising the 
glory of the town. In other cases, establishing a university turned out a decisive push for 
a city’s growth. Botero refers here to Paris, where the Sorbonne magnetized students and 
professors alike early on, emphasizing that an institution like this could have beneﬁ cial 
inﬂ uence on a number of other professions as well. Finally, political life can also be 
crucial: to become a governmental centre could determine the fate of a town, while such 
a strong impetus at one place could turn out to be fatal for its competitors, who would 
not necessarily be able to counterbalance their advantage in other ways. Considering all 
these aspects together, one can say that even Botero provided a complex overview of the 
economic and technological underpinnings of early-modern urban development, from 
a kind of comparative historical (sociological) perspective on the European city.
The other important topic which emerges in Botero’s thought, and which is not whol-
ly independent from the Salamanca-style theoretical background, is the eﬀ ort to reach 
a global – comparative – perspective. His third and thickest project is entitled Relazioni 
Universali (1591–1595). It covers a rather wide area: “Its four parts oﬀ er a descrip-
tive cosmography: of the continents and islands of the globe; of the principal states 
and their rulers; of the world’s peoples and their faiths, and of the challenges presented 
by New World peoples and their religious practices”.34 In the newly discovered global 
arena Europe deﬁ ned its own task as that of keeping order and peace. This programme 
was announced by Botero in accordance with the literary heritage of the Aeneis, but 
his framework for Europe is, of course, already Roman Christianity. He thought that 
the Spanish struggle for world dominance was easily understandable from his Northern 
Italian, Catholic – and for that matter Jesuit – perspective, too. In accordance with the 
Ciceronian, Humanist discourse, he added that the least developed peoples of the world, 
in order to be ready for “paciﬁ cation”, also needed to reach an acceptable standard of 
“civility”. This target requires their being settled down, and their acquisition of literacy. 
Only a culture which satisﬁ es these prerequisites can give due honour to God, or in the 
non-Judeo-Christian tradition, to the gods. Botero’s own programme of creating a global 
33  N.J.G. Pounds, A Historical Geography of Europe, 1500–1840, Cambridge 1978, p. 28–29.
34  D. Cosgrove, Globalism and Tolerance in Early Modern Geography, “Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers” 2003, Vol. 93, No. 4, p. 865.
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civilisation of high culture turns out to be, in the ﬁ nal analysis, a kind of this-worldly 
theodicy. 
Naturally, as was pointed out earlier, the present paper cannot pay due attention to 
these last two works of Botero’s, with their typical Jesuit themes. This is the more regret-
table because they, too, played a role in laying the foundations of Botero’s prestige as an 
early representative of political realism. Botero’s achievement on these ﬁ elds is the more 
remarkable if we recall that even Machiavelli was hardly interested in the economic con-
ditions of a ﬂ ourishing state. From this perspective, Botero must have been – directly or 
indirectly – inspired by the Salamanca School and Jesuit tradition. And, whence he had 
an economic interest, and he explained the success of cities partly from their economic 
geographic and geo-political location, it is almost natural that his theory of state opened 
up towards an early, historical-comparative study of international relations. 
Without getting deeper into their content, the following conclusion can be drawn. If 
we consider how Botero takes into account the (micro- and macro-) geographical and 
economic aspects, we have to admit Romain Descendre’s idea which suggests that we 
should not analyse Botero’s oeuvre in a segmented manner, but together, in their totality, 
at least as far as the three major works are concerned.35 Descendre argues that by reading 
the three books together we will see how far Botero’s work can indeed be regarded as 
a new, early-modern Renaissance of political realism. 
A theoretical approach to Botero’s teaching – the meaning
of prudentia
If we accept that the Jesuit-Catholic connection is crucial to an understanding of Botero’s 
eﬀ orts, then some further questions may be raised, as well. One of these questions, and 
an outstanding one, is this: if we want to evaluate Botero’s political thought, what rel-
evance should we attribute to his sceptical, pseudo-Machiavellian, Tacitist line? In other 
words: what can we answer to the problem posed by Peter Burke, who thought that 
Botero’s book on reason of state is a document of his farewell to the Aristotelian view.36 
The present paper argues that this is not exactly the right direction if we want to make 
sense of Botero’s endeavour. To reposition it, however, it seems to be necessary to con-
nect the answer to this question with the reply to another question by Maurizio Viroli, 
a late 20th century republican theorist. In his opinion Botero’s project is an important 
step in that process, which led from a politics with a civic, republican overtone towards 
one aiming to build up a monarchic, absolutist, centralised state. In other words, away 
from the Florentine model of political participation, and towards the French model of the 
35  “J’ai pour ma part voulu savoir s’il était possible d’interpréter les trois livres de Botero comme autant 
de pièces d’un unique dispositif théorico-politique, non systématique, certes, mais cohérent”. R. Descendre, 
L’état du monde: Giovanni Botero entre Raison d’État et géopolitique, Genève 2009, p. 13.
36  Peter Burke’s message is already contained in the title of the chapter in the Cambridge History of 
Political Thought 1450–1700, entitled The End of Aristotelianism, under which Peter Burke’s own article on 
Tacitism is to be found.
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unlimited power of centralised state machinery. This paper contests this interpretation, 
claiming that the reconstructed picture should not be so simple and black-and-white. 
Botero’s reason of state is neither an exodus of morality from the campaign ﬁ elds of 
politics, nor a withdrawal of politics from the debating halls of morality. What really 
happens is that Botero recognizes that in politics it is indeed crucial that the decision 
maker confront the really burning issues of the day. This can only be achieved if the ruler 
is not obliged by the pressing circumstances of the moment to deceive members of his or 
her country’s citizenry. Now this is an explicitly Aristotelian problem: how can a politi-
cal leader answer the challenges of a given situation without sacriﬁ cing his identity (his 
belief, conviction, heritage), and without denying his principles? Botero’s shorthand an-
swer to this haunting question is the concept of prudenza in his book on reason of state. 
This answer is directly based on the way Aristotle talks about phronesis in Book 6 of 
the Nicomachean Ethics. It resurfaces in Cicero’s volumes on politics, and in the way it 
was overtaken by Aquinas, in his commentaries on Aristotle and in the relevant (moral-
theological) parts of his Summa. 
If we take the concept of prudentia seriously enough, it can even answer the ques-
tion raised by Viroli, too. After all, practical wisdom is clearly not a category which 
concerns only the tyrant. It is the character trait of the virtuous and the just (or at least 
politically, pragmatically acceptable) ruler. Aristotle draws a memorable example: that 
of Pericles. The picture makes it clear that the Aristotelian category of practical wisdom 
is not simply about the monarch or tyrant. Monarchs, aristocracies, and even plebeians 
can be prudent. After all, as we have seen, prudence played a crucial role in early-modern 
ideas about the ideal courtier, as well. For Gracián, who wanted to elaborate the theory 
of Castiglione, even the hero becomes virtuous by obtaining practical wisdom. Gracián, 
too, started his career – like Botero himself – as a Jesuit monk, and he, too, criticised 
Machiavelli. The virtue of prudence is surely not a privilege limited only to the holder of 
power, but is generally a pre-condition for participating in politics. In this sense the ca-
tegory connects the ancients, the Aristotelian tradition of the humanists, and the dis-
course of reason of state initiated by Botero. 
Let us see, now, more concretely, how the author characterises practical wisdom in 
the second book of Ragione di stato. As we have seen, this virtue often goes together 
with valour. But practical wisdom is, in fact, a real spiritual potential. Botero’s ideal ruler 
is familiar with the councils of moral philosophers and political theorists. He knows a lot 
about human nature, too. The former leads him to the insight that the human being is 
a victim of his own passions, the latter to the assumption that a good government should 
control human passions (Book 2, Chapter 2). Control for him means the art of keeping 
internal order within the individual, but also mastery of the science of war and peace 
for the wellbeing of the community. Both of them require, as usual, the help of rhetoric. 
In order to exercise social control, both the renaissance and the baroque ruler required 
a court. According to humanist ideals, Botero expected the ruler to be able to control 
the republic of letters, too; to wield the pen as well as the sword. His ruler is a strategic 
player in the battle of the books, a master of that science, which may help him directly in 
his political practice: in history (Book 2, Chapter 3).
Botero makes use of the theatrical metaphor of history. According to him watching 
the dramas of the theatre of the past, the ruler can gain experience without risking or los-
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ing anything. He can learn much about the habits and customs of his people, as well as 
about the political institutions of other nations, which would hardly be possible in any 
other way in those days. He follows the footsteps of Aristotle (instead of Plato), when 
he defends poetry. As he sees it, poetry can help the ruler by oﬀ ering him inspiring he-
roic examples from the past to follow. But Botero connects historical lessons and poetic 
exemplars with an acquaintance with human nature, as well. For him human nature is 
deﬁ ned by education, age, and individual life circumstances. In these matters Aristotle 
has already given ample instruction. 
One of Botero’s returning themes is the determining inﬂ uence of the environment 
(Book 2, Chapter 5). Much earlier than Montesquieu, there is a geographic determin-
ism in Botero’s way of thinking, presenting the northern peoples as followers of the 
republican model or of elected monarchy (including Transylvania as well, but excluding 
both England and Scotland), while the southern ones are characterised by religious en-
thusiasm and superstition. The same way he creates oppositions between mountain- and 
valley-dwellers, between islanders and peoples from the mainland. The environment was 
discussed in a detailed manner in his third inﬂ uential book, Relazione Universali. In his 
book on reason of state the issue of geopolitical determinism is only touched upon in 
a few short passing remarks.
In the same way we can read short advisory gnomes here taken over from the tra-
ditional mirror for princes’ literature. These are samples to show that the author is also 
aware of that genre, and that he is able to take the traditional role of the adviser, as well. 
In the summary of his life we have already pointed out that for some time he actually 
held the role of political adviser. His pieces of advice in this book concern, for example, 
the art of waging war, and focus on timing, too. As we have mentioned, Botero follows 
the tradition of ancient Greco-Roman practical philosophy, which can be traced back 
at least to the Greek concept of phronesis. This ancient concept was traditionally con-
nected to the concept of kairos (the well-chosen, appropriate moment).37 The connection 
between the two concepts is this: practical wisdom can be grasped as undelayed ac-
tion (action with appropriate timing). “Learn to recognise the critical moment (conoscer 
l’occasioni dell’imprese) in war and aﬀ airs and to seize opportunities as they appear 
(abbraccia opportunamente)” [46]. In order to accomplish this, Botero requires the same 
thing that Aristotle required: designing the action should not take too long, but leave the 
options of improvisation and intuition open, the impulse of the moment and last minute 
changes prevail: after all, adequate action will always be best accommodated to the oc-
casion. To ﬁ nd the right timing (tempo) is almost as important for the action of the ruler, 
as it is for the musician. 
Describing the practical wisdom of the ruler, Botero provides a full chapter on the 
question of secrecy. As he sees it, the ability to keep secrets is an all-important virtue. In 
this case, his reference is Tacitus, which is not at all surprising. We have already hinted 
at the popularity in Renaissance-Humanistic rhetoric of the conceptual pair simulation/
dissimulation, for which Tacitus again is Botero’s source. As Botero sees it, whenever 
it is possible, the ruler should seek advice, before he acts. And in this respect advisers 
37  F. Horkay Hörcher, Prudencia, kairosz, decorum. A konzervativizmus időszemléletéről (Prudence, 
Kairos, Decorum: Of the Temporal Thinking of Conservatism), “Információs társadalom: társadalomtudományi 
folyóirat” 2006, 6 (4), p. 61–80.
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with practical experience (pratica) [51] are the better choice than theoretically minded 
advisers, because their advice is better tuned to the demands of the moment, and less 
likely to be lost among real circumstances. With this idea Botero once again turns back 
to Aristotle (as opposed to Plato), when he compares the judgement (giudicio) of experi-
enced men (essercitati) [70] to that of the learned. In subchapter 9 of On the avoidance 
of Novelty (del non far nouità) he claims that experience favours things that have been 
tried, while change itself is always risky. To insist on things and procedures which have 
already proved useful is a rational choice. Here the reference is Roman, the history by 
Titus Livius, according to which “no change from former ways is welcome; men prefer 
the old ways unless they are obviously bad in practice” [51].38
Furthermore, the preservation of the power of the ruler depends on reputation, in 
other words on the evaluation (riputatione) of his earlier activity. The legitimacy of 
power is more decisively determined by the virtue attributed by others to the prince, his 
valour, than by his actual potential (potenza) [72]. For subjects to accept the rule of their 
prince, there is always a need for a ﬁ ctive element, which is more important, than the 
actual material reality of power. Fiction depends on rhetoric. In other words, rhetorical 
means are all important in political games. But rhetoric is not enough: the real impact 
upon the people, royal reputation, is achieved by the deeds of the ruler, not his words. 
Now the question arises: how exactly did Botero negotiate between the claim about the 
ﬁ ctive nature of power and the weight of real action as opposed to words?
There is no real contradiction here, the two claims do not exclude each other. On the 
contrary, both of them are important building blocks of Botero’s early-modern political 
realism. Suppositions, ﬁ ction, and acceptance by the other party can play such a major 
role in the preservation of political power, because imagination is such an important part 
of human consciousness, and imagination attributes a lot of signiﬁ cance to these modes 
of perception. To fancy something can become a real (political) deed, too, therefore 
to inﬂ uence imagination is in the interest of political agents. Therefore, as pointed out 
already by Machiavelli, what matters is not only the facts about a statesman, but also 
the eﬀ ects that they can trigger in other minds, through which the statesman earns his 
social prestige. The recognition of the importance of imagination is a constitutive ele-
ment of political realism. However, there is a purely Aristotelian principle behind this 
recognition: that a politician needs to avoid extremes (estremi), and has to show matu-
rity (mature) and moderation (moderato) [79]. When this principle is accepted we can 
explain why we need to rate truth (verità) above suppositions (opinione) [80]: truth is 
usually somewhere in between the extremes of suppositions. The priority of the middle 
way can lead people to temperance (temperanza) [97], and the clearly Christian virtue 
of faith (Religione) [88, 92]. It is here that Botero’s ruler confronts the most important 
constraints of his potential ﬁ eld of action: the divine law (legge di Dio) [89], which can-
not be disregarded by any ruler. Reason of state cannot provide the grounds to justify 
trespassing divine legislation. On the contrary: the ruler’s will must always give priority 
to God’s will. Religion provides in this sense the foundation of society – as in Cicero’s 
political thought. 
38   See: T. Livius, The History of Rome, 1–8, XXXIV, 54, 8 (1853 edition; Project Gutenberg). 
The Renaissance of Political Realism in Early Modern Europe: Giovanni Botero...
2-łamanie-KS.indd   205 2016-10-21   13:51:11
206
Artykuły – Articles
In other words in Botero’s line of argument prudence is not a principle which can even 
push the traditional, ancient-Christian doctrine of virtues into the background, much less 
demolish them. However, while it ﬁ ts well into its scheme, it lends that doctrine a realist 
political tone, which helps the ruler (and the particular political agent in general) ﬁ nd 
the right action under pressure with the help of a sense of discretion, respecting univer-
sal constraints upon his freedom of choice. Even in connection with divine law Botero 
returns to the virtue of moderation, without which none of the other cardinal virtues 
could prevail. The emphasis on the social use of religion brings Botero’s theory close 
to Cicero’s earlier Roman conception, integrating Christian virtues into the tradition of 
ancient virtues. In this respect, Botero’s theory resembles Thomist and humanist ways 
of thinking, in that it squares two diﬀ erent traditions: ancient philosophy and Christian 
moral theology. But it does so in a way which leads to the foundation of a new discourse, 
already addressing some of the problems of modern societies, including a widened pri-
vate realm along with the harmonisation of the private and the public interest. The real 
achievement of Botero’s theory is that it does this without the radical break which is so 
obtrusive in Machiavelli’s The Prince.
Postscript. The grand narrative of reason of state: From Botero 
to Richelieu, Metternich, and Kissinger
As we have seen, it was not Botero who invented the discourse of reason of state, but 
he was the ﬁ rst one who built its most important conceptual elements into a theoretical 
structure. We have good reasons to regard him as the founder of the discourse, even 
if the term itself was already in use long before his time, in the oeuvre of authors like 
Guicciardini and Della Casa. In the ﬁ nal part of this paper let us have an overview of 
the consequences of the birth of this new discourse, in the context of early-modern and 
modern ways of talking about international relations. 
The starting point of our history is the French translation of Botero’s 1589 book, 
which was published in 1599 as Raison et gouvernement d’estat. It was translated by 
Gabriel Chappuys, and published in Paris. With it a process was started, which was 
unfolding not only on a theoretical-ideological level, but also in terms of power politics 
within the conﬁ nes of the Thirty Years’ War, turning the Italian doctrine into a French 
one. Instead of principalities it came to be applied to monarchies and other forms of larg-
er centralised absolutistic states. This application is exempliﬁ ed by Cardinal Richelieu 
who used the concept and the theory behind it to realise his plans of state building, by 
deceit if necessary, and by force if that was what was needed. The term’s French transla-
tion, raison d’état began a new life, independently from its original Italian context, but 
closely connected to Richelieu’s person and the context of the court of Louis XIV in 
the eyes of posterity.39 Richelieu was not only a great statesman, he tried to put down in 
words his own theory of politics, which allows us to consult it directly.
39  T. Poole, Reason of State: Law, Prerogative, Empire, Cambridge 2015, p. 98. The author refers to 
a conceptual distinction by Philip Bobbit, diﬀ erentiating between an Italian and a French model, beside 
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Richelieu did not live long enough to see the result of the Thirty Years’ War, his 
masterwork was crowned therefore by his follower, Cardinal Mazarin. The peace trea-
ties of Westphalia, planned by the latter, which ended the long decades of Europe-wide 
wars, regulated the relations of sovereign states by introducing a new, global real politi-
cal principle: the ideal of the balance of power. From Westphalia a straight, but bumpy 
road lead to the Peace of Vienna in the early 19th century which aimed at a closure of the 
Napoleonic invasion similar to the one which closed the Thirty Years’ War earlier. Here 
again the primary aim was to establish a continental peace system. In the context of the 
early 19th century it could be achieved by a continental agreement of the major play-
ers, including France. The decisive inﬂ uence during the negotiation process, Richelieu’s 
19th century counterpart, was Prince Metternich, who was a very skilful statesman and 
diplomat, and could convince the competing partners to accept his own scenario. The 
ﬁ rst condition of this success was to prefer the reliable experience of the past not only 
about the nature of politics, but speciﬁ cally, too, about the particular interests of the 
individual players, and about the geopolitical realities of the European society of states. 
That Metternich was in possession of such knowledge is once again proven by written 
text, his Memoires: 
Politics is the science of the vital interests of States in its widest meaning. Since, however, an iso-
lated state no longer exists […] we must always view the society of states as the essential condition 
of the modern world […]. The great axioms of political science proceed from the knowledge of 
the true political interests of all states, it is upon these general interests that rests the guarantee of 
their existence […]. The establishing of international relations, on the basis of reciprocity under the 
guarantee of respect for acquired rights […] constitutes in our time the essence of politics.40
In other words, Metternich had already recognised, that what he needed to stabilise 
was not simply a country or an empire, but a whole global (or at least continental) order, 
a society of states. And although his achievement can be legitimately criticised if we 
take into account how long and to what degree he was deaf to the demands of liberty 
among the populaces of these continental states, in other words how far he was unable to 
make sense of the internal dynamics of European societies, he was for a long time suc-
cessful to arrest the more aggressive, warlike manifestations of competition among the 
newly born nation states within the concert of European powers in Europe itself. Taking 
into account the later eﬀ ects of the Holy Alliance that he initiated, including the horrors 
of World War I, his actual historical performance does not seem so glorious. And yet, 
the Versailles peace system, which concluded World War I, was even more fragile, and 
brought within itself the germ of an even more catastrophic event, World War II and the 
Holocaust. 
It was within this context that the initiation of a new science of international relations 
became urgent. The European-wide disasters of war, with their unimaginable destruction 
of human life, including the death camps themselves, demanded novel solutions from 
a German one, marked by the term Staats raison (or Staatsräson). Signiﬁ cantly, this latter term refers also 
to the birth of the territorial state – which in the case of Germany means Prussia and the statecraft and 
bureaucratic machinery of Frederick the Great. Ph. Bobbit, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the 
Course of History, New York 2002.
40  C. Metternich, Mémoires, documents et écrits divers laissés par le Prince de Metternich, chancelier 
de cour et d’Etat, Vol. 1, Paris 1881–1886, p. 30. 
The Renaissance of Political Realism in Early Modern Europe: Giovanni Botero...
2-łamanie-KS.indd   207 2016-10-21   13:51:11
208
Artykuły – Articles
the victorious super-powers as well. It was in this traumatic historical situation, that 
a talented and politically motivated Harvard student of European origins wrote his doc-
toral thesis. The title of the work was: Peace, Legitimacy, and the Equilibrium (A Study 
of the Statesmanship of Castlereagh and Metternich) (1954), and its author was Henry 
Kissinger.41 Born in Germany into a Jewish family, he had to escape from the Hitler 
regime in Germany with his family in 1938. The young academic kept searching for the 
right moment to make a memorable entry into the realm of foreign policy of his new 
home country, the US, which was taking over a world-dominating role in those years. 
His doctoral thesis was of course much more than simply an old fashioned narrative of 
political or diplomatic history. In it he prepared and worked out his famous Realpolitik, 
in connection with European diplomacy but within the framework of the newly emerging 
study of international relations.
With this last link, which connects the future American Secretary of State and his fa-
mous idol, the Cardinal of the 19th century European Holy Alliance, we could indirectly 
hint at the connection between the Italian humanist and Jesuit, Giovanni Botero, who 
established the doctrine of reason of state, and the American foreign policy expert, and 
proponent of realistic policies, Henry Kissinger, who was himself blessed with a vast 
amount of historical and theoretical background knowledge. Kissinger’s academic and 
political success supports our initial thesis, that in order to make sense of the political 
challenges of our day it is crucial to pay attention to history. Therefore we need the 
historical turn, which brings into contact the science of international relations with the 
history of political thought. To fully justify this thesis in the abstract, however, requires 
another paper, as the topic stretches well beyond what can be expected in a paper on 
Botero and reason of state. Yet the paper hopefully could show the relevance of its par-
ticular author for our present concerns, political and economic, national and global, and 
this is all that it aspired to.
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